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REPLY TO LAURA GUERRERO 
 
Guerrero has done an excellent job summarizing my basic claims. I also greatly 
appreciate her careful historical clarifications of the term svabhāva in Nyāya and 
Abhidharma.  She offers a valuable clarification of the anti-realist interpretation. And 
her work taking this interpretation into the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school is fascinating. 
I look forward to seeing how she continues to pursue that in the future. 
  But, of course, I would be undermining the conventions of our current academic 
context if I merely praised her comments and didn’t answer some of her substantive 
objections.  Let me limit myself to three main points. 
  First, I am not sure that quite as much rests on my specific reading of anti-realism 
as self-undermining as Guerrero seems to think. While I do still think a theory of 
universal emptiness has issues (more on that point in a bit), the origin of my skeptical 
interpretation is really a larger problem with Nāgārjuna’s texts, like the MMK and 
VV, insofar as they contain both “positive” claims about emptiness but also 
“negative” claims about the relinquishing of all views or theses (Mills 2018, 26-27). 
  The anti-realist way to resolve this tension has often involved square brackets, to 
say that Nāgārjuna meant “all [false] views” (MMK 27.30). But I took up my 
interpretive task to wonder if we might take another way. What if he actually meant 
all views?  Not views of a certain kind or views implicitly involving svabhāva, but all 
views – full stop? 
  Of course, most Buddhist scholars block this move, as Guerrero does, by invoking 
things like a general sense that Buddhism must be about liberating knowledge, the 
presence of Right Views as part of the Eightfold Path, and so forth. Thus, no Buddhist 
could ever be a skeptic. I’ll return to this later, but I will point out for now that these 
are further assumptions that are by no means beyond questioning. 
  My interpretation then is an experiment: What if we took Nāgārjuna at his word?  
Could we make sense of his seemingly-absurd claims of positionlessness? Could we 
do so while also making sense of this as a development of aspects of earlier Buddhist 
and non-Buddhist traditions? What if we focus on what Nāgārjuna’s arguments are 
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supposed to do to the reader’s inner psychology as part of a Buddhist practice in a 
manner similar to Hellenistic Skepticism and Stoicism? As I saw it, few previous 
scholars had thoroughly explored these questions (although the 12th century Tibetan 
Buddhist philosopher Patsab Nyimadrak comes close). 
  I suppose my two-phase interpretation as I have written it does revolve around the 
contradiction as a means to move from phase one to phase two. Whether emptiness 
undermines itself or not, Nāgārjuna seems to be wondering what, if anything, 
philosophers would have left to say once they were thoroughly immersed in 
emptiness. 
 So, I could sum up this point with a parody of Nāgārjuna’s enigmatic verse 29 of 
the VV: If my entire interpretation rested on a particular claim that the thesis of 
universal emptiness undermines itself, I would have a fault. But it does not, so 
therefore I have no fault. 
  My second point is about the deepest and most interesting part of Guerrero’s 
comments: her reading of the emptiness of emptiness. Guerrero makes a helpful 
distinction between Ultimate1 or “reality/truth as it is known by the wise” and 
Ultimate2  or “A technical sense introduced by the Ābhidharmikas to indicate reality 
that is fundamental, i.e., real existence (dravya) that is determined by svabhāva and 
the truths regarding that reality” (Guerrero 2019, 95). 
  What follows is to my mind the best defense of the anti-realist interpretation I’ve 
seen yet. I’ve never denied that anti-realism is a possible interpretation of Nāgārjuna.  
I happen to think it’s not the best interpretation, but it is better than many others (like 
irrationalism or empiricism). 
  Guerrero makes a number of other intriguing moves that I will pass over for now.  
She ends up putting all this together to claim that emptiness of emptiness means that 
“the nature of being empty is also not intrinsic” (Guerrero 2019, 98). 
  My question is: if emptiness is not intrinsic, then…so what? Why would it be 
important to point out at all, especially if it’s supposed to be common sense? This is a 
lot of heavy philosophical theory for common sense. If philosophy becomes common 
sense what does philosophy have to say that common sense itself does not already 
say? Even the subtle reminders that Guerrero and others like Georges Dreyfus and 
Jay Garfield (2011) have suggested don’t really leave much for philosophers to do.  
Or maybe there is nothing left for philosophy to do, but then that’s just what my 
skeptical interpretation says. 
  Let me summarize this in a dilemma: If philosophy does add something to 
common sense, how can it avoid making ultimate claims (in whatever sense), which 
in turn leads to various problems? If philosophy does not add something to common 
sense, is philosophy completely superfluous? Either philosophy engenders the 
problems of ultimate truth, or it adds nothing to the pretheoretical understandings of 
common sense. 
  But, one might object that I have yet to address whether the thesis of universal 
emptiness is logically consistent. I am of the opinion that it is inconsistent, but I think 
Guerrero has corrected what may have been Garfield’s mistake, a mistake I may have 
erroneously endorsed. 
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    I still think global anti-realism of a more general sense is logically inconsistent, as 
I argue in a prasaṅga argument of my own at endnote 29, on page 47 of my book. 
Whether it is possible to avoid this inconsistency in the manner Guerrero proposes is 
something I will have to consider further. 
  But I still think there is some sense in which a thesis of universal emptiness 
undermines much, if not all, of what most of philosophers in both classical India and 
contemporary academia would think of as philosophy. Given the lack of intrinsic 
natures, how could one ever specify what emptiness actually is with anything like the 
rigor Guerrero proposes? If emptiness itself lacks a stable, definable characteristic, 
what happens to all that careful textual and linguistic work and all those precise 
philosophical distinctions that analytically-minded philosophers in classical India or 
contemporary North America love so much? This, I think, is Nāgārjuna’s deeper 
question. 
  Nāgārjuna’s immediate target is svabhāva or what Guerrero calls Ultimate2, but 
the ultimate target (pun intended) is something even deeper than that.  Due to the 
especially dialectical nature of the classical Indian tradition in general and ancient 
skepticism about philosophy in particular, Nāgārjuna cannot simply come out and say 
something like “I reject every possible philosophical theory in all times and places.” 
  Nāgārjuna certainly has a problem with the concept of svabhāva, but it’s not his 
only problem. The deeper problem is the attachment to views that an idea like 
svabhāva seems to encourage. But one could become attached to any view, even 
emptiness itself. As MMK 13.8 says, “The antidote to all views is proclaimed by the 
conquerors to be emptiness. Those who have a view of emptiness the conquerors 
called incurable.”1 
  So, I ask: Why can’t Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no views include views in the 
sense of Ultimate1, the truth according to the wise? 
  I’m reminded of a conversation I had with Mark Siderits a few years ago. After 
hearing a talk where I gave an overview of my skeptical interpretation, he said that he 
and I don’t actually disagree, because anti-realism is not a theory. I left the 
conversation a bit unsure what he meant, but I think he meant that anti-realism is 
more of an attitude about philosophical activity. And maybe this attitude is what 
Nāgārjuna is explaining in MMK 27.29: “And thus, due to the emptiness of all beings, 
in regard to what, for whom, of what things at all, will views, concerning eternality 
and so forth, be possible?” Once you give up on finding Ultimate2 or something like 
it, it’s hard to see what would be left to say about Ultimate1. So, when Nāgārjuna says 
the purpose of the Buddha’s teaching is the relinquishing of all views in MMK 27.30, 
I think he means that, whether a thesis of universal emptiness is logically inconsistent 
or not, after it does its work, one is left with nothing more to say. 
  I do, unfortunately, have more to say. My third and final point has to do with 
methodological issues. 
  A point on Early Buddhist quietism and the analysis-insight strand: Buddhism is a 
big, messy thing with lots of strands put to lots of uses. To make a bit of an anti-
 
1 All translations from Sanskrit are my own unless otherwise noted. 
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realist point myself: there is no one thing that all Buddhists must think. My point is 
that Nāgārjuna had conceptual resources for both the analysis-insight and quietist 
strands and it is at least plausible that he combined them in a way that can make sense 
of his own puzzling texts. 
  Another quick point: there is also something odd about asserting that Buddhist 
philosophers could be propagating common sense when Buddhists have a long 
history of arguing for claims that are anything but common sense: suffering, non-self, 
momentariness, etc. 
  Also, I wholeheartedly admit Nāgārjuna’s texts are therapy for intellectuals.  
There are other Buddhist therapies for other types of people. Normal people surely 
suffer, but it is primarily intellectuals who suffer the disease of having extensive 
theories about svabhāva. 
  Even given Guerrero’s excellent defense of anti-realism, I still don’t think it 
dissolves the tension between the positive and negative programs. And that’s what 
I’m trying to do, although if Siderits is right, maybe we disagree less than I think. 
  My interpretation relies less on undermining anti-realism and more on how to 
better make sense of the text. One could do so as an anti-realist. Guerrero gives good 
insights on how to do that. But the text itself underdetermines all interpretations, 
including of course my own. 
  Whatever Nāgārjuna is doing, I doubt he’s merely offering a technical 
philosophical theory. I often wonder whether Nāgārjuna would laugh at our attempts 
to make coherent philosophical sense of his texts. Is there some more subversive 
point all of us are missing in our attempts to get at a meaning compatible with 
contemporary academic philosophy? Are we meant, rather, to stop, to turn our gaze 
deeper into our own motivations, perhaps to a place where anti-realism and 
skepticism momentarily merge and then dissipate into something we still after 1,800 
years lack the philosophical vocabulary to articulate? 
  I’m not sure. But I think these questions are part of why Nāgārjuna continues to 
fascinate so many philosophers today. And I am sincerely thankful to Guerrero for 
her fascinating defense of the anti-realist interpretation. 
  Yet Nāgārjuna is not the only philosopher that fascinates. (Perhaps one could 
even say he receives more than his fair share of fascination). So, I will move on. 
 
REPLY TO RACHANNA KAMTEKAR 
 
Turning next to Kamtekar’s exemplary comments, it occurs to me that while writing a 
book that is somewhat inter-sub-disciplinary is fun, it also opens one up to criticisms 
from many different angles. For example, I venture into Hellenistic philosophy and 
work with my own interpretation of Sextus Empiricus. Kamtekar rightly notes that 
my interpretation is hardly non-controversial. 
  My impression is that there is no more a standard view of Sextus than there is a 
standard view of Nāgārjuna, but I admit that I am much more of an outsider when it 
comes to Sextus: whereas I have a pretty good idea when things I say about 
Nāgārjuna are going to seem outré to most of my colleagues, I am far less confident 
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about how my understanding of Sextus appears to scholars of ancient Greek and 
Hellenistic philosophy. I am thankful to Kamtekar’s insider’s perspective for steering 
me toward some clues on this matter. 
  One point about Sextus about which I have said too little is the long-standing 
scholarly dispute about whether Sextus has no beliefs or some beliefs. Let me come 
clean and say that I lean heavily toward the “no belief” or “rustic” interpretation; I am 
aware this is controversial, but as a bit of an outsider I’m not sure exactly how 
controversial it is. 
  Kamtekar makes the point that my distinction between Sextus’s target being 
belief rather than knowledge is a matter of “nomenclature, not substance” (Kamtekar 
2019, 102). I think it is more substantial, because Sextus only focuses on knowledge 
insofar as it involves belief, whereas modern skeptics worry first about knowledge 
and only incidentally about belief. Again, the some belief versus no belief debate is 
here. Also, I don’t agree that “Pyrrhonian skepticism may turn out to be a theoretical 
position after all” (Kamtekar 2019, 102). 
  Let me focus quickly on Kamtekar’s two main points.  First, on positionlessness, I 
think our deeper disagreement has to do with the coherence of the no belief 
interpretation. Kamtekar says, “Insofar as the practice of skepticism involves making 
claims…” (Kamtekar 2019, 104). Yet that Sextus is making claims is precisely what 
scholars like Thorsrud and I are denying. 
  On being a Buddhist skeptic, my point is that Buddhism as a religious identity or 
a religious practice need not be focused on explicitly articulated belief. The “sayings” 
could be part of the practice, which is what I take Sextus’s point to be. Buddhism 
already has concepts such as neyārtha, conventional truth, and skillful means, which 
may make sense of what’s going on here. 
  Kamtekar’s point on prasajya versus paryudāsa negations and entailments versus 
presuppositions is fascinating. I will have to give this further consideration. My hunch 
is the Sextan route is the way to go. In fact, I do argue that Jayarāśi is reporting how 
things seem to him in a rather Sextan manner as descriptive rather than normative 
(Mills 2018, 90-91). 
  Is Kamtekar right (along with Burnyeat) that Sextus unwittingly has secret 
beliefs?  I don’t think so, but again this pushes us into the territory of a centuries-long 
interpretive dispute about Sextus, which I can’t hope to resolve in this response. I will 
note, however, that much of this dispute involves trying to understand a Pyrrhonian 
mindset from the outside. Once skeptical therapy has done its job, the mindset of a 
Pyrrhonian skeptic may be quite different than we dogmatists can understand. As R. 
J. Hankinson notes, there is a mistake that “views the Sceptic’s mental life from the 
standpoint of the Dogmatist, and assumes that, even after the Sceptical medicine has 
taken its effect, the structure of the Sceptic’s assents and dissents will remain largely 
the same as before” (Hankinson 1995, 286). 
  Kamtekar’s other main point on cessation of conceptualization versus suspension 
of judgment is interesting and worth further inquiry. When I say that Sextus’s target 
is philosophy, I mean that he is generally focused on things philosophers and other 
self-styled experts say. Maybe he thinks farmers and merchants have their own kinds 
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of dogmatisms, but he is not much concerned to engage with them. Just as 
Nāgārjuna’s targets are mainly Naiyāyikas and Ābhidharmikas, so are Sextus’s 
mainly Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics, and Platonists. But for both of them the 
deeper target is something else: dogmatism for Sextus and attachment to views for 
Nāgārjuna. 
  I admit I may be foisting more unity on these targets than is warranted, but my 
point has only ever been comparative. The category of “skepticism about philosophy” 
is, to use a Buddhist term, a conceptual construction, but one that I think has its uses.  
I am not making any claim so rash as to say that Sextus and Nāgārjuna are saying the 
same thing. But their targeted mental states are to my mind quite similar, which of 
course if hypotheses about historical contact between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism have 
any truth to them at all would be unsurprising. 
  In the future I hope to work on a Nāgārjunian/Jayarāśian/Śrī Harṣian reading of 
Sextus. In particular, I wonder if the three pillars could help scholars understand what 
Sextus thinks is wrong with dogmatism in the first place. This may in turn create a 
new position on the old debate about whether Sextus has some or no beliefs: maybe 
the problem with beliefs is that we are attached to them, and Pyrrhonism is a family 
of therapies designed to cultivate the knack of purging oneself of the desire or 
tendency to create such sources of attachment. I leave to my future self the question 
of whether a skeptic could possess beliefs without being attached to them. In any 
case, Kamtekar’s comments here will greatly help my future self should such a 
project come to fruition. 
 
REPLY TO JENNIFER NAGEL 
 
Turning to Nagel’s insightful comments, I’m first of all glad that she recognized the 
fun of all this and that she was convinced about at least some things. I don’t expect 
this book to convince many readers, so when it even partly convinces someone I see 
this as an unexpected bonus. 
  I will have a bit to say about several of Nagel’s points, but I particularly 
appreciate the framing of things as being anti-philosophical versus being a 
philosophical reformer (Nagel 2019, 112). 
  I’m attracted to semantic contextualism in epistemology because of its way of 
making sense of both external-world skepticism and regular life in non-philosophical 
contexts. I thought something like this might be the key to understanding how 
Jayarāśi can so vociferously critique the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) while also 
claiming to follow a worldly way of life, one that I argue is entirely compatible with 
the irreligious Cārvāka school.   
  I am especially grateful to Nagel’s comments on contextualism as she is a great 
deal more familiar with the literature in this area than I am. I also found it interesting 
that she engaged with my brief comments on shallow-deep knowledge in the 
conclusion (Mills 2018, 174-175), which I would at best refer to as an impressionistic 
proto-theory. And she has a great point on how I may not differ from Cohen as much 
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as I think (Nagel 2019, 112-113). I’d like to thank Nagel for these clarifications in 
terms of my uses (and hopefully not abuses) of contemporary contextualism. 
  Nagel makes an interesting point on what contextualists think is the role of 
epistemology vis-à-vis ordinary epistemic talk. Going back to Guerrero’s and other 
anti-realist, conventionalist interpretations of Nāgārjuna, though, I wonder what such 
additional theory is actually adding. It seems to me that the more contextualism “is 
motivated by a desire to save and explain the empirical data of ordinary talk involving 
‘know(s)’ and its cognates”, the less one would have to say about contextualism over 
and above what is already included in those everyday contexts. 
  And what is the context of contextualism itself? In an endnote, I cite an excellent 
article by Elke Brendel, who argues that “there is no context in which the 
contextualist can claim to know that her theory is true” (Brendel 2005, 38; Mills 
2018, 97 n. 34). Brendel’s argument is complex and involves a great deal of epistemic 
logic, but for my present purposes it suffices to say that Brendel exploits the sort of 
self-referential argument that Jayarāśi loves. As Nagel notes, I am not of course 
claiming that Jayarāśi explicitly supports contextualism, partly because I think he 
would apply similar reasoning to contextualism as he applies in the Impossibility of 
Considering Duality Argument against Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. 
  Let’s turn next to Śrī Harṣa. Nagel’s take on Śrī Harṣa is similar to Jonardon 
Ganeri’s. But Ganeri’s point is that this new way of doing philosophy is one of two 
possibilities. He says that Śrī Harṣa “leaves us somewhat uncertain whether we 
should be searching for a new way to do philosophy, a way that doesn’t require us to 
participate in ungrounded intellectual activities, or whether we are meant to abandon 
philosophy altogether and adopt quieter, less aggressive, ways of approaching truth” 
(Ganeri 2016, 16). 
  I think the overwhelmingly negative thrust of the text gives some evidence in 
favor of the second hypothesis, although of course the first cannot be ruled out.  
There remains a lot more to consider when it comes to Śrī Harṣa, who I have come to 
see as one of the most original and fascinating philosophers in his or any 
philosophical tradition. I hope others will line up to sample from Śrī Harṣa’s Buffet of 
Destruction. There are, I suspect, great feasts of philosophical delight to be found in 
this woefully understudied masterpiece of philosophy. 
  Those wanting to explore what new modes of philosophical activity Śrī Harṣa 
could be exploring in the first hypothesis, however, would do well to start with 
Nagel’s conjecture that Śrī Harṣa’s point may be, somewhat like Timothy 
Williamson’s “knowledge-first” epistemology, that “there is some primitive and 
unanalyzable (or undefinable) phenomenon of knowledge itself”. 
  When it comes to Śrī Harṣa’s ultimate aims, he is hoping readers will be at least 
open to non-dual experience. When I say that this experience itself cannot be the 
conclusion of a philosophical argument, I have in mind the inherently paradoxical 
nature of claiming to say anything about non-dualism (Mills 2018, 129-130), but also 
the fact that as enthusiastic as Śrī Harṣa may be about exhorting his readers to try it 
for themselves, he never argues in favor of non-dualism as a philosophical thesis.   
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  This is part of what I mean by Upaniṣadic mystical skepticism, which to be sure 
Śrī Harṣa develops to a far more sophisticated degree than it appears in the Upaniṣads 
themselves. In a forthcoming paper (Mills 2019) I argue that the mystical possibility 
can itself be taken as a kind of skeptical scenario meant to make readers less certain 
about their own everyday conception of reality—reality may be, for all we know, 
quite different than we take it to be. I think this is some kind of skepticism, but as 
Nagel notes, it is not exactly captured in its Western ancient or modern analogues. 
  On the meaning of “philosophy”, this has in fact been one of the biggest 
criticisms I have faced. How can I define something called “skepticism about 
philosophy” without specifying what, exactly, these skeptics mean by “philosophy”?  
I often remain resolute and say that for these skeptics it is purely dialectical. They 
can’t, on pain of contradiction, give their own definition of philosophy; they merely 
criticize what their opponents say about the matter. For my part as an interpreter who 
claims only to be a mitigated skeptic about philosophy, I come dangerously close to 
defining philosophy as something like Wilfrid Sellars’s vague definition involving an 
inquiry into how things hang together (Mills 2018, xxxiv-xxxv n. 16) or the pursuit of 
what I enigmatically refer to as “deep knowledge” (Mills 2018, 174-175). 
  As admittedly vague and impressionistic as all this is, it’s perhaps hard for me to 
give a concrete answer to Nagel’s dichotomy of rejecting versus reforming 
philosophy.  But just as one can disagree with one’s friends, I am by no means bound 
to the attitude of the three pillars themselves despite the intellectual camaraderie I feel 
with them. As a mitigated skeptic about philosophy—and of course a philosophy 
professor myself—I do feel that there is some room for something called philosophy 
and that asking philosophical questions is a natural thing for people to do, but I think 
the three pillars encourage us to think carefully and deeply about what both reformed 
and unreformed philosophical activities can and can’t do for us today. 
  I thank Nagel for her excellent comments that will help to continue these 
conversations. 
 
In conclusion, I’d like to once again thank each of the participants. I will now take 
Jayarāśi’s advice and stop so readers can enjoy other things. 
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